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 Struggles for a global Internet constitution: 
protecting global communication structures 
against surveillance measures * 
 a n d r e a s   f i s c h e r - l e s c a n o  
 University of Bremen ,  Law Department ,  Universitätsallee GW1 ,  D-28359 Bremen 
 Email:  voelkerrecht@zerp.uni-bremen.de 
 Abstract:  In 2014, the UN Human Rights Committee published its Concluding 
Observations on the United States’ fourth periodic report on the progress of the 
implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (UN Doc 
CCPR/C/SR/3061), in which also the US surveillance practices are criticised. The 
Committee’s insistence on the right to privacy and its exterritorial effect is an important 
ﬁ rst step, but it is not comprehensive, as by remaining within the individual rights 
framework the UN Human Rights Committee fails to sufﬁ ciently take into account the 
systemic challenges in play. Developing a constitution of the Internet would necessitate 
not only protecting individual fundamental rights against state interference, but 
protecting communicative spheres by guaranteeing institutional autonomies and 
subjecting all social spheres to democratic control; this also requires opening 
up spaces for a critical public, including whistleblowers, and establishing a right to 
cryptography – a crucial refraction in the polycentric panoptic schema. 
 Keywords:  encryption ;  institutional human rights ;  surveillance ;  systems 
theory ;  whistleblowing 
 In its Concluding Observations on the United States’ report on the progress of 
the implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(UN Doc CCPR/C/SR/3061) (ICCPR), the UN Human Rights Committee 
addressed among other matters fundamental and human rights issues 
in respect to the right to privacy that have sparked worldwide debates, 
known as the National Security Agency (NSA) affair. Its brief comments 
point in the right direction, but they disregard crucial aspects in the struggle 
over constitutionalising the Internet in the era of global surveillance. 
 The global surveillance machinery establishes a polycentric transnational 
panopticon, whose self-governance architecture can – building on Foucault – 
only be overcome by putting in place refractions and vision breaks, to prevent 
 *  Translation into English by Nora Markard. 
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the apparatuses from snifﬂ ing out the remotest social corners. A systems 
theoretical perspective expands the Foucauldian vision, taking into account 
a multiplicity of threats to societal autonomies that emerge not only from 
the political system, but also from other societal systems. In this perspective, 
the global panopticon is an expression of societal polycentricity in a world 
society fragmented into different functional systems, each pursuing its own 
systemic logic.  1  Against this background, the core issues in the struggles 
for a global Internet constitution cast a different light on the way in which 
classic liberal doctrine has traditionally posited itself. The constitutional 
task in the transnational constellation is to release social energies in various 
communicative spheres and – at the same time – prevent those energies 
from harming human and social autonomies. The dramatic consequences 
of this challenge is brought to the surface in the struggles for a global 
Internet constitution. 
 I.  Global surveillance 
 With the revelations he made in the summer of 2013, Edward Snowden drew 
the world public’s attention to the degree to which the global networks of 
surveillance apparatuses control our lives. There isn’t a text message, call, 
Facebook chat, or Google search request, a credit card operation or an 
email that couldn’t at least potentially be downloaded, saved, scanned 
and fed into a network of metadata for further analysis. This is staggering 
in scope as approximately 194 million text message metadata run through 
global data bunkers every single day. Tapping into the optical ﬁ bre cables 
between Europe and the Far East, the NSA scans somewhere between three 
and six petabyte of data per day, which corresponds to the data volume 
of one and a half to three billion digitalised songs. These data undergo a 
selection process and are then stored in databases, including in the US.  2  
What we call ‘the cloud’ may in fact be nothing more than a euphemism 
for a dark bunker in Idaho. 
 1  Systems theory, as developed by Niklas Luhmann, assumes that world society is irrevocably 
differentiated into functional systems, such as the political system, the economic system, the 
religious system, etc. Each follows its own functional logic, seeking to maximise the interests it 
promotes. Humans and nature form the environment of this society of systems. See N Luhmann, 
 Introduction to Systems Theory (Cambridge and Malden, MA, Polity Press, 2013). For an 
overview of the author’s critical theory approach to systems theory, see A Fischer-Lescano, 
‘Critical Systems Theory’ (2012) 38  Philosophy and Social Criticism 3–23; A Fischer-Lescano, 
‘A “just and non-violent force”? Critique of Law in World Society’ (2015) 26  Law & Critique 
267–80. 
 2  G Greenwald,  No Place to Hide: Edward Snowden, the NSA, and the U.S. Surveillance 
State (Macmillan, New York, NY, 2014) 90ff. 
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 Panopticism 
 Edward Snowden’s revelations have provided critical insight into a gigantic 
transnational panopticon.  3  Alluding to the hundred-eyed Panóptes of the 
Greek mythology,  panopticon is a term that refers to a system of complete 
surveillance. Already in the eighteenth century, in his book  Panopticon or 
The Inspection House , the utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham suggested 
surveillance as governance technique. The panopticon, he argued, was the 
ideal form of organisation for prisons, factories, poor houses, hospitals, 
schools, etc, since it increased performance and nipped opposition in the 
bud early by permanent, equal, universal and all inclusive surveillance: 
‘Ideal perfection, if that were the object, would require that each person 
should actually be in that predicament, during every instant of time.’  4  
 What Jeremy Bentham conceptualised as cost–beneﬁ t optimisation, 
Michel Foucault took as point of departure for a searing critique of society. 
Foucault shows how the panoptic principle pervades social conditions in 
all of their ramiﬁ cations. In  Discipline and Punish , he describes panopticism 
as the governance technique of modern societies. His criticism is directed 
at the resulting loss of liberty: ‘Whenever one is dealing with a multiplicity 
of individuals on whom a task or a particular form of behaviour must be 
imposed, the panoptic schema may be used.’  5  But even more revealing was 
Foucault’s analysis on the subtle effect of the casual coercion of surveillance. 
Security dispositives do not rely on physical coercion. They optimise powerful 
knowledge techniques. Interrogation management, psychiatric surveys, 
moralising campaigns and social work replace corporal punishment, but 
ultimately they affect the body more intensely. Surveillance stimulates a 
self-technology, which operates not externally but by initiating an observer-
observation. The individuals observe themselves through the eyes of the 
observer. As a result, the panoptic scheme operates by way of self-discipline: 
‘He who is subjected to a ﬁ eld of visibility, and who knows it, assumes 
responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them play spontaneously 
upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power relation in which he 
simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the principle of his own 
 3  See, e.g., L Backer, ‘Global Panopticism: States, Corporations, and the Governance Effects of 
Monitoring Regimes’ (2008) 15  Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 101;  K-M  Simonsen , 
 ‘Global Panopticism: On the Eye of Power in Modern Surveillance Society and Post-Orwellian 
Self-Surveillance and Sousveillance-Strategies in Modern Art’ in  L  Dahlberg (ed),  Visualizing 
Law and Authority. Essays on Legal Aesthetics ( De Gruyter ,  Berlin ,  2012 )  232 . 
 4  J Bentham, ‘Panopticon, or ‘The Inspection-House’ [1787] in M Božovi č (ed),  The Panopticon 
Writings (Verso, London and New York, NY, 1995) 31, Letter I. 
 5  M  Foucault ,  Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison ( Vintage Books ,  New York, 
NY ,  1979 )  205 . 
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subjection.’  6  To break this pattern, it is not enough to capture the control 
centre. Simply occupying the tower of the panopticon does not mean 
stepping outside of the schema of hegemony and counter-hegemony. The 
goal, as Foucault puts it in his essay ‘The Eye of Power’, must be to rob the 
tower guards of their vision, to create refractions, to alter the architecture, 
depriving the panoptic dispositive of its premises.  7  
 Transnational surveillance apparatuses 
 Both Bentham and Foucault start from the political dimension of surveillance 
and the effect it has on the subject. However, in a functionally differentiated 
world society, the panoptic schema operates in a much more complex manner. 
 Polycentric surveillance.  Panopticism isn’t limited to individual institutions 
with a top, a centre and a surveillance tower. Rather, the panoptic schema 
operates without limits; it is organised polycentrically. Transnational networks 
of surveillance apparatuses surveil even the remotest corners of society. 
World society is a surveillance society. It may be ‘without an apex or center’  8  
but the polycentric surveillance networks are no less effective than centralised 
panoptic institutions. 
 Who is behind these surveillance apparatuses? The analysis of the 
NSA complex revealed a whole network of secret services. Thus, the 
so-called ‘Five Eyes’ cooperate under the United Kingdom – United States 
of America Agreement (UKUSA Agreement), that is, the secret services of 
ﬁ ve English-speaking countries: the US National Security Agency, the British 
Government Communications Headquarter (GCHQ), the Australian Signals 
Directorate (ASD), the Canadian Communications Security Establishment 
(CCSE) and the New-Zealand Government Communications Security Bureau 
(GCSB). These work with further national secret services, including the 
German Federal Intelligence Service ( Bundesnachrichtendienst , BND). 
 6  Ibid 202–3. 
 7  M Foucault, ‘The Eye of Power’,  Semiotext(e)’s Schizo-culture issue III (1978) 2, 6–19. 
Asked whether those subjected to surveillance should usurp the central tower, Foucault 
answered: ‘Yes, provided that this is not the end of the operation. Do you believe that things 
would be much better if the inmates seized control of the panopticon and occupied the tower, 
rather than the guards?’ Ibid, 19 (trans. Mark Seem). 
 8  N Luhmann,  Political Theory in the Welfare State (De Gruyter, Berlin, 1990) (trans. 
J Bednarz, Jr, orig. 1981) 31, emphases omitted; on the polycentric Internet governance see 
S Taekema, ‘Crossroads in New Media, Identity and Law. Fragments and Continuities of Law 
and ICT: A Pragmatist Approach to Understanding Legal Pluralism’ in W de Been, P Arora, 
M Hildebrandt (eds),  Crossroads in New Media Identity and Law: The Shape of Diversity to 
Come (Palgrave Macmillan, New York, NY, 2015) 80. 
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 These state services not only cooperate with one another but also work 
in close coordination with international organisations such as NATO 
as well as private actors. In the US, in addition to the 30,000 NSA staff, 
60,000 employees work for external service providers of the NSA. At the 
time when he collected the NSA documents, Edward Snowden himself was 
not directly employed by the NSA, but worked for the PC company Dell, 
later for the NSA service provider Booz. On top of these subcontractors 
involved in the surveillance network, other global players including Facebook, 
Yahoo, Google, Microsoft and other transnational companies collaborate 
closely with state security organs  9  
 One of the most signiﬁ cant changes that the age of surveillance has 
brought about is the increasing difﬁ culty of separating surveillance by 
governments from that by commercial entities. Public- and private-sector 
surveillance are intertwined – they use the same technologies and techniques, 
they operate through a variety of public/private partnerships, and their 
digital fruits can easily cross the public/private divide […] Even if we are 
primarily worried about state surveillance, perhaps because we fear the 
state’s powers of criminal enforcement, our solutions to the problem of 
surveillance can no longer be conﬁ ned to regulation of government actors. 
Any solutions to the problem of surveillance must thus take into account 
private surveillance as well as public.  10  
 Functional differentiation in world society.  Finally, non-state actors are 
involved in surveillance not only through public–private partnerships but 
through functional areas, with each actor operating within them contributing 
to transnational panopticism. By collecting sensitive data, they pursue 
interests, speciﬁ c to the respective functional system. 
 At the global economy level it is not security but the maximisation of 
consumption that is the key objective of the myriad international players. 
Data is a commodity and collecting it is a business model. At the various levels 
of the supply chain of the information and communications infrastructure, 
corporations such as Google, Apple and Facebook have virtually unlimited 
access to data and to the processes and content of communication within 
their area of authority. Applying different business models, they collect and 
analyse these data so as to sell them on to others for further use.  11  To optimise 
 9  See also CJEU, judgment of 6 October 2015, Case C-362/14 –  Maximillian Schrems v 
Data Protection Commissioner , ECLI:EU:C:2015:650, clarifying the responsibilities of EU 
organs to protect against surveillance practices in the context of Facebook communication. 
 10  NM Richards, ‘The Dangers of Surveillance’ (2013) 126  Harvard Law Review 1934, 1958. 
 11  W Hoffmann-Riem, ‘Freiheitsschutz in den globalen Kommunikationsinfrastrukturen’ 
(2014) 69  Juristenzeitung 53, 53. 
 150  andreas fischer-lescano 
these business models, corporations develop their own spy software.  12  
Academia, too, happily accesses the digital communication sphere to conduct 
research on data and surﬁ ng behaviour without obtaining user consent.  13  
Other ‘functional systems’ contribute to transnational panopticism according 
to their own, speciﬁ c logic. The religious system controls ‘res sacrae’ and 
believers via the Internet;  14  the health system surveys patients and promotes 
the health logic with Internet-based informational systems, and so forth.  15  
The aim of these functional systems is clear – to regulate, and in some instances 
to control, the behaviour of users and followers. 
 In short, the functional systems of world society seek to put the worldwide 
web at their service, each according to their own particular interest. 
Surveillance and big data seeks to pursue a logic that is greater than that 
of securitisation.  16  Religious puriﬁ cation and the maximisation of proﬁ t 
and knowledge evoke threats as well. However, these do not result from 
‘old governments or industries that hate openness’, but from industries 
and societal institutions ‘that oppose those old control freaks the most’.  17  
 Transformation of subjectivity 
 This functional differentiation of world society also transforms the 
understanding of subjectivity. Social discipline through subject discipline 
is only one manifestation of the panoptic schema. That schema is not – as 
Foucault conceived it – limited to involving political or legal subjects in 
a circle of observer-observation. The economy is not interested in potential 
terrorists, but in consumers; academia is interested in users as test subjects, 
religion in believers, health in patients, art in the  homo aestheticus , etc.  18  
 Therefore, societal autonomies are not only threatened by the totalising 
tendencies of the political system to limit the liberties of its subjects but 
 12  A Müller-Maguhn, L Poitras, M Rosenbach, M Sontheimer and C Grothoff, ‘Treasure 
Map: The NSA Breach of Telekom and Other German Firms’  Spiegel Online International , 
14 September 2014. 
 13  R Booth, ‘Facebook Reveals News Feed Experiment to Control Emotions’,  The Guardian , 
30 June 2014. 
 14  See, with further references, R Lewis,  God Is Watching, and So Am I: The Theology of 
Surveillance , 27 April 2012, available at < http://ﬂ owtv.org/2012/04/god-is-watching >, accessed 
2 February 2016. 
 15  L Ohno-Machado, ‘Health surveillance using the internet and other sources of information’ 
3 (2013)  Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association 403. 
 16  On this concept, see B Buzan, O Wæver and J de Wilde,  Security: A New Framework for 
Analysis (Lynne Rienner, Boulder, CO and London, 1998). 
 17  J  Lanier ,  Who Owns the Future? ( 2nd edn ,  Simon & Schuster ,  New York, NY ,  2014 )  198 . 
 18  BC Han levels this polycentricity when he sees the ‘biopolitical disciplinary society’ 
replaced by the ‘psycho-political transparency society’; BC Han,  Im Schwarm: Ansichten des 
Digitalen (Matthes & Seitz Berlin, 2013) 98. 
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rather, functionally differentiated world society delineates boundaries within 
which individuals interact with the systems. It is in these parameters that 
threats arise from the speciﬁ c energies of the speciﬁ c functional systems. 
It is in these systemic relations within society, and in the relations of each 
social system to its environment, that the central problems of differentiated 
world society develop.  19  
 II.  Internet surveillance before the UN Human Rights Committee 
 Against this background, how does law access this polycentric panoptic 
schema? Which normative, and this means counterfactual, expectations is 
the transnational facticity of surveillance confronted with? 
 Legal basis and procedure of the Committee 
 Law is engaged with surveillance measures in contending fragments of order. 
Both domestic proceedings, such as in US courts under the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (FISA), and supranational norms  20  and proceedings, as in 
the case of Google Spain,  21  have attempted to address protection against 
panoptic governance technology. The UN Human Rights Committee’s 
Concluding Observations of 26 March 2014  22  is the ﬁ rst commentary 
from a quasi-judicial panel at the global level.  23  
 The Committee operates on the basis of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).  24  The Covenant was concluded in 
New York on 16 December 1966 and entered into force on 23 March 1976. 
 19  N Luhmann,  Gesellschaftsstruktur und Semantik , vol 2 (Suhrkamp, Frankfurt, 1993) 80. 
 20  See the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation) which shall enter into force in 
2018 see European Council, Press Release 18.12.2015, ‘EU data protection reform: Council 
conﬁ rms agreement with the European Parliament’, available at < http://www.consilium.europa.
eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/12/18-data-protection/ >, accessed 2 February 2016. 
 21  CJEU, judgment of 13 May 2014, Case C-131/12 –  Google Spain, ECLI: EU:C:2014:317. 
 22  CCPR, Concluding Observations on the Fourth State Report of the United States of 
America, 110th Meeting, 26 March 2014, UN Doc CCPR/C/SR/3061, para 22. The state report 
dates from 30 December 2011. Along with the Government’s response from 3 July 2013 to the 
Committee’s list of questions, including on the NSA complex, the report is available from the 
US Department of State at < http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/c16069.htm >, accessed 2 February 
2016. 
 23  From the political sphere, see also UN General Assembly Resolution 68/167,  The Right 
to Privacy in the Digital Age , 18 October 2013, UN Doc A/RES/68/167; see also the Report of 
the Ofﬁ ce of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights,  The Right to Privacy 
in the Digital Age , 30 June 2014, UN Doc A/HRC/27/37. 
 24  999 UNTS 171. 
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It has 168 state parties; a further seven states (including Cuba and China) 
have signed but not ratiﬁ ed the Covenant. The US signed the Covenant on 
5 October 1977, but the ratiﬁ cation took another 15 years. Since 8 June 
1992, the US has been bound by the Covenant, which protects the right to 
privacy in its Article 17. 
 The Human Rights Committee (or CCPR) is the UN body charged 
with enforcing the Covenant. An individual complaint procedure can be 
commenced if the defendant state has ratiﬁ ed the First Optional Protocol 
to the Covenant, which entered into force on the same date. Since the US 
has not accepted this procedure, matters pertaining to its obligations under 
the ICCPR can only be brought before the Committee in the procedures 
provided for in the Covenant. The US has subjected itself to the state 
complaint procedure under Article 41 ICCPR, but this procedure has not 
been used once in the history of the Covenant. Thus, when pronouncing 
itself on the NSA affair, the Committee was acting not under a complaints 
procedure, but on the occasion of the state reporting procedure under 
Article 40 ICCPR. This procedure obliges state parties to regularly report 
on the progress made in respect to the enjoyment of rights as enshrined in 
the Covenant. In accordance with Article 40(4) ICCPR, the Committee 
studies these reports from which it formulates observations. 
 This procedure has the potential to promote transparency where it 
can function as a channel for civil society efforts to keep governments in 
check.  25  The ofﬁ cial state reports are regularly accompanied by so-called 
‘shadow reports’ from NGOs.  26  The Committee also consults with NGO 
representatives and uses their reports as a basis for subsequent in-depth 
discussions with the state party. 
 Unlike the complaints procedures, the reporting procedure does not 
result in a binding decision, but in ‘recommendations’. It is organised in a 
trial-like manner in that there is a hearing, followed by a ﬁ nal pronunciation 
that applies abstract legal norms to concrete societal facts. However, 
in contrast to an adversarial trail the reporting procedure doesn’t seek to 
adjudicate an individual case. Instead, the proceedings are open, the agenda 
evolves over the course of the procedure and there are several opportunities 
for NGO representatives to make interventions. Finally, the Concluding 
 25  A Liese, ‘Epistula (non) erubescit. Das Staatenberichtsverfahren als Instrument 
internationaler Rechtsdurchsetzung’ (2006) 81(1)  Die Friedens-Warte. Journal for International 
Politics and Organization 51–9. 
 26  Shadow Reports on the Fourth State Report of the United States can be found at the 
Center for Constitutional Rights, CCR (< http://www.ccrjustice.org/iccpr >, accessed 2 February 
2016) or the American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU (< https://www.aclu.org/human-rights/
faq-covenant-civil-political-rights-iccpr >, accessed 2 February 2016). 
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Observations do not set out binding legal obligations which emanate from 
a formal authority; their effectiveness depends ﬁ rst and foremost on 
whether the recommendations are accepted by society through the power 
of normative persuasion – which in turn mobilises the support of the wider 
public.  27  
 Walter Benjamin described the forms and virtues of the intercourse 
between state diplomats as delicate and peaceful, because it leads to 
nonviolent agreement beyond legal decision-making, ‘and therefore beyond 
violence’.  28  Similarly, the reporting procedure institutionalises forms and 
virtues of law that do not follow the traditional pattern of adversarial 
legalism, and are therefore also not characterised by the violent decision 
of a case. In this procedure, the methodology applied is the argumentative 
engagement with societal questions of responsibility. The reporting 
procedure is not characterised by authoritative decision-making of hard law, 
but by normative persuasion through argument, convincing positionality, 
participatory practice, responsive modes of operation, a sure sense of justice 
and an intuition for conﬂ ict.  29  However, under the current circumstances, 
this strength of the reporting procedure is also its weakness; it is often 
selective in the matters that it chooses to address and does not always offer 
an effective counterweight to the coercive apparatuses. For the problem 
of law and violence is profound; in a society marked by power-driven 
structures and conﬂ icting interests, a procedure that forgoes legal enforcement 
structures risks rendering itself ineffective if it cannot counter the violence 
of other societal forces. 
 At the same time, where institutions renounce formal enforcement powers, 
the greatest threat arises from the political opportunism of the institution 
itself; a jurisprudence that panders to the interests of the states puts the 
legitimacy of the reporting procedure at risk. Therefore, it is rather 
misguided to contend that the legitimacy of forums of international justice 
is wholly dependent on the acceptance of the states. Indeed, global legal 
 27  For a sceptical view, see S Schmahl, ‘Effektiver Rechtsschutz gegen Überwachungsmaßnahmen 
ausländischer Geheimdienste?’ (2014) 69  Juristenzeitung 220, 222. 
 28  W Benjamin, ‘Critique of Violence’ (1920/21) in P Demetz (ed),  Reﬂ ections. Essays, 
Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings translated by E Jephcott (Schocken Books, New York, NY, 
1986) 277, 293. 
 29  For suggestions on optimising this, see U Davy, ‘Welche rechtlichen Grundregeln müssen für 
einen wirksamen Menschenrechtsschutz gelten? Eine rechtswissenschaftliche Betrachtung’ in C Gusy 
(ed),  Grundrechtsmonitoring: Chancen und Grenzen außergerichtlichen Menschenrechtsschutzes 
(Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2011) 238, 257–8, who rightly opposes the ‘master narrative’ of the 
superiority of judicial versus reporting procedures. In particular, expanding the duty to 
consider the jurisprudence of the monitoring bodies could increase the position of the bodies in 
domestic law – see L Viellechner, ‘Responsive Legal Pluralism: The Emergence of Transnational 
Conﬂ icts Law’ (2015) 6  Transnational Legal Theory 312–32. 
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institutions require legitimacy with respect to the ‘peoples’ and ‘citizens’.  30  
Transnational judicial forums cannot be limited to serving the needs of 
states, current court clients, nor can legitimacy be achieved if they do not 
enable those who are not included in the classic patterns of representation 
to be heard: the ‘unrepresented’ described by Jacques Derrida, the ‘excluded’, 
to quote Niklas Luhmann, the ‘superﬂ uous’, as Susan Marks calls them, 
the ‘rural poor’ in Gayatri Spivak words, the ‘subaltern’, as Boaventura 
de Sousa Santos and César Rodríguez-Garavito write.  31  Transnational 
judicial forums will only ﬁ nd societal acceptance if they move beyond 
concentrating on procedural framing and start to critically engage with the 
myriad complexity of societal structural conﬂ icts that are being translated 
into the  quaestio iuris . 
 Applicability of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights 
 What stance, then, did the UN Human Rights Committee take on the 
panoptic schema? Any action by the Committee in the transnational 
surveillance case at hand presupposes that the Covenant is applicable in 
the ﬁ rst place. 
 Extraterritorial applicability: Article 2 ICCPR.  First, the extraterritoriality 
of the measures may constitute an obstacle to the applicability of the 
ICCPR. The interference of surveillance measures habitually takes place 
beyond the territory of the surveying state, across and between boundaries. 
Pursuant to Article 2(1) ICCPR, a State party must grant the rights of 
the Covenant ‘to all individuals within its territory and subject to its 
jurisdiction’. These two criteria apply alternatively, not cumulatively.  32  
 30  In this sense A von Bogdandy and I Venzke, ‘In Whose Name? An Investigation of 
International Courts’ Public Authority and Its Democratic Justiﬁ cation’ (2012) 23  European 
Journal of International Law 1, 7–41. 
 31  J Derrida, ‘On Cosmopolitanism’ in  On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness (Routledge, 
London and New York, NY, 2001); N Luhmann, ‘Inklusion und Exklusion’ in Luhmann, 
 Soziologische Aufklärung ,  6 :  Die Soziologie und der Mensch (VS Verlag, Wiesbaden, 1995) 
237; S Marks, ‘Law and the Production of Superﬂ uity’ (2011) 2(1)  Transnational Legal 
Theory 1; GC Spivak, ‘Righting Wrongs’ (2004) (2/3) 103  The South Atlantic Quarterly 523; 
B de Sousa Santos and C Rodríguez-Garavito, ‘Law, Politics and the Subaltern in Counter-
Hegemonic Globalisation’ in de Sousa Santos and Rodríguez-Garavito (eds),  Law and 
Globalization from Below. Towards a Cosmopolitan Legality (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2005) 1. 
 32  S  Joseph and  M  Castan ,  The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: 
Cases, Materials, and Commentary ( 3rd edn ,  Oxford University Press ,  Oxford ,  2013 ) para 
4.11ff. 
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The exercise of jurisdiction over an individual makes the Covenant applicable 
even if she is not present in the territory of the State party.  33  
 There has long been debate over the deﬁ nition and scope of jurisdiction; 
however, there is little jurisprudence from the Committee on what constitutes 
the exercise of ‘effective control’. Indeed, already over a decade ago, the 
Committee, in its General Comment No 31 of 29 March 2004, asked 
whether the individual in question is ‘within the power of effective control’ 
of the respective state.  34  However, the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) expounded upon the concept of effective control in its  Al-Skeini 
judgment on the extraterritorial applicability of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR) which serves as guidance for Article 2(1) ICCPR. 
The ECtHR distinguishes three forms of ‘effective control’, namely (1) the 
exercise of physical force that can bring persons under the state’s control 
extraterritorially; (2) individualised exercise of jurisdiction by state organs 
abroad; and (3) domestic acts of state with extraterritorial effects.  35  Following 
this elaboration, surveillance measures do not necessarily amount to 
physical control over a person but instead to virtual control, which, due to 
its disciplinary effect mentioned above, can be considered equivalent to 
physical control with respect to the scope of application of the Covenant.  36  
 Consequently, in its Concluding Observations on the United States’ report, 
the UN Human Rights Committee determined against the continuing 
opposition of the US  37  that the ICCPR also applies to the US’ surveillance 
measures – both with respect to measures within and outside of the US. 
It also clariﬁ ed that the Covenant applies irrespective of the nationality and 
place of domicile of the persons concerned.  38  Afﬁ rming the extraterritorial 
applicability of the Covenant with respect to the surveillance measures, 
 33  On the extraterritorial applicability of human rights generally, see ICJ,  Legal Consequences 
of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory , Advisory Opinion, 9 July 
2004, ICJ Rep 2004, 136, at para 107ff; on the ICCPR speciﬁ cally, see, e.g., CCPR,  Lopez 
Burgos v Uruguay , 29 July 1981, Case No 52/1979, UN Doc A/36/40, paras 12.2–3. 
 34  CCPR, General Comment No 31, 29 March 2004, UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, 
para 10. 
 35  ECtHR, judgment of 7 July 2011,  Al-Skeini v United Kingdom , App No 55 721/07, 
[2011] ECHR 1093, para 133ff. 
 36  A Peters, ‘Surveillance without Borders: The Unlawfulness of the NSA Panopticon, 
Part 2, 4 November 2013, available at < http://www.ejiltalk.org/surveillance-without-
borders-the-unlawfulness-of-the-nsa-panopticon-part-ii/ >, accessed 2 February 2016, but 
see S Talmon, ‘Der Begriff der “Hoheitsgewalt” in Zeiten der Überwachung des Internet- 
und Telekommunikationsverkehrs durch ausländische Nachrichtendienste’ (2014) 69 
 Juristenzeitung 783–7. 
 37  The Permanent Mission of the United States of America to the Ofﬁ ce of the United 
Nations, Follow-up Response to the Recommendations of the Human Rights Committee, 
31 March 2015, No 038-15, para 33. 
 38  CCPR, Concluding Observations on the US, see (n 22) para 22. 
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this jurisprudence thus constitutes a ﬁ rst step to overcoming the legal 
territorial dilemma.  39  Since then, it has been supported by a number of 
statements in the course of the Universal Periodic Review Procedure of 
the Human Rights Council in May 2015. In response to the US report,  40  
states and stakeholders have submitted substantial recommendations, a lot 
of which invoke the extraterritorial dimension of the right to privacy.  41  
 No public emergency: Article 4 ICCPR.  The US routinely justiﬁ es the 
surveillance measures with security requirements that, it argues, after 9/11 
have deeply transformed the ‘balance between security and civil liberties’.  42  
Article 4(1) ICCPR provides for the possibility of suspending speciﬁ c rights 
‘in time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the 
existence of which is ofﬁ cially proclaimed’. It is thus conceivable that the 
 39  Concerning the exterritorial application of human rights obligations in cases of mass 
surveillance see also United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘The Right to 
Privacy in the Digital Age’ see (n 23) para 31ff; Council of Europe Commissioner of Human 
Rights, ‘The Rule of Law in the Internet and in the Wider Digital World’, Issue Paper by D Korff, 
December 2014, 48ff; Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Committee on Legal 
Affairs, Report: ‘Mass Surveillance’, Rapporteur P Omtzigt, 18 March 2015, Doc 13734, 29ff; 
insisting on the physical effect of surveillance and on the exterritorial dimension of human 
rights obligations M Milanovic, ‘Human Rights Treaties and Foreign Surveillance: Privacy in 
the Digital Age’ (2015) 56(1)  Harvard International Law Journal 81. 
 40  United States of America, National report submitted in accordance with para 5 of the 
annex to Human Rights Council resolution 16/21, 13 February 2015, A/HRC/WG.6/22/USA/1. 
 41  See among others the critical statements on the US practice concerning mass surveillance 
by Azerbaijan (para 293), Costa Rica (para 294), Kenya (295), Liechtenstein (296), Germany 
(303) and Turkey (307) in Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Working Group on the 
Universal Periodic Review – United States of America, 20 July 2015, A/HRC/30/12; see also 
the summary prepared by the Ofﬁ ce of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights in accordance with para 15(c) of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 5/1 and 
para 5 of the annex to Council resolution 16/21. United States of America, A/HRC/WG.6/22/
USA/3, 16 February 2015, para 58: ‘JS36 indicated that the US Government has been secretly 
sweeping up digital communications and personal data around the world with little oversight 
from either the judiciary or legislature, and recommended that the US respect the privacy of 
individuals outside its territorial borders. HRW made a similar recommendation. JS15 stated 
that the US authorities, on a daily basis, are intercepting the private communications and other 
personal electronic data of hundreds of millions people across the globe. JS15 recommended 
that the US discontinue all indiscriminate interception, retention, use and dissemination of 
individuals’ private communications both within and outside US territory and jurisdiction.’; cf 
the stereotype answer of the US: ‘We support these recommendations insofar as they recommend 
respect for ICCPR Article 17, which applies to individuals within a state’s territory and subject 
to its jurisdiction’ (Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review, United States 
of America, ‘Views on conclusions and/or recommendations, voluntary commitments and replies 
presented by the State under review’, 14 September 2015, A/HRC/30/12/Add.1, para 14). 
 42  See the response of the US Government to the CCPR’s list of questions, at (n 22) para 
119; generally on the security argument, see already ECtHR, judgment of 6 September 1978, 
App No 5029/71 –  Klass and ors. v Germany , [1978] ECHR 4. 
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US could employ the securitisation argument in a legal manner to suspend 
the right to privacy generally. Since the right to privacy, protected by Article 
17 ICCPR, is not among the non-derogable rights contained in Article 4(2) 
ICCPR, such a suspension in situations of emergency is permissible. 
 However, the threshold for a public emergency is high.  43  Not every 
measure can be justiﬁ ed through a public emergency premise, and not every 
catastrophe constitutes a public emergency. Even in armed conﬂ ict, the 
possibility of relying on the pronouncement of a public emergency is limited.  44  
Indeed, at best, surveillance measures may constitute acts of hazard control; 
they do not conform to the Committee’s strict criteria for the existence of 
a public emergency. The security argument can therefore not dispense the 
US from the binding force of the Covenant provisions. Consequently, the 
US has not even moved towards taking procedural steps to declare a public 
emergency, which namely requires the issuing an ofﬁ cial proclamation 
(Article 4(1) ICCPR) and notifying other State parties (Article 4(3) ICCPR). 
 Self-executiveness.  Finally, the applicability of the Covenant might be put 
into question by the declaration made on the occasion of the ratiﬁ cation 
of the Covenant, namely ‘that the provisions of articles 1 through 27 of 
the Covenant are not self-executing’. However, this declaration does not 
divest these provisions of their internationally binding effect; it merely 
serves to limit their domestic applicability and the generation of subjective 
legal positions in domestic law. The declaration cannot undermine the 
binding character of the Covenant rights under international law.  45  
 Right to privacy: Article 17 ICCPR 
 The question is therefore, which legal framework does the Covenant 
set for surveillance measures? The provision of primary relevance  46  here 
is Article 17 ICCPR, according to which ‘[n]o one shall be subjected to 
arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or 
 43  M Nowak,  UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights , (2nd edn, NP Engel Publishers, 
Kehl, Strasbourg and Arlington, TX, 2005) art 4, paras 12ff. 
 44  CCPR, General Comment No 29, 31 August 2001, UN Doc CCPR/C/Rev.1/Add.11, 
paras 2ff. 
 45  GA Sinha, ‘NSA Surveillance Since 9/11 and the Human Right to Privacy’ (2013) 59 
 Loyola Law Review 861, 904. 
 46  This is not exclusive. Further potentially affected human rights include the rights to 
freedom of expression, to liberty, to health, to work, to the highest attainable standard of 
living, and to equality and non-discrimination, see C Kent, L McGregor, D Murray and 
A Shaheed, ‘Embedding Human Rights in Internet Governance’ (3 November 2015)  EJIL Talk , 
see < www.ejiltalk.org >, accessed 2 February 2016; insisting on the implications of the non-
discrimination see also United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on 
‘The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age’, at (n 23) para 35ff. 
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correspondence’. Article 17(2) grants everyone the ‘right to the protection 
of the law against such interference or attacks’.  47  
 By using the general term ‘correspondence’, the Covenant does not 
distinguish between written, oral, electronic, visual, haptic or other forms of 
correspondence. As the Committee noted in its General Comment No 16, 
Article 17 ICCPR protects the integrity and conﬁ dentiality of all forms of 
communication: ‘Surveillance, whether electronic or otherwise, interceptions 
of telephonic, telegraphic and other forms of communication, wiretapping 
and recording of conversations should be prohibited.’  48  Article 17 ICCPR 
prohibits ‘arbitrary or illegal’ interferences. Even interferences that are based 
on a domestic statute, such as FISA in the US, must not be arbitrary,  49  that 
is, they must be undertaken ‘in accordance with the provisions, aims and 
objectives of the Covenant and should be, in any event, reasonable in the 
particular circumstances’.  50  
 Against this background, the Committee applied the Covenant and in par-
ticular Article 17 to the surveillance measures and urged the US to uphold its 
obligations to the implementation of the Covenant.  51  In detail, the Committee 
requested a redesign of the measures within the following parameters:
  
  •  Respect for the principles of legality, proportionality and necessity regardless 
of the nationality or location of individuals whose communications are 
under direct surveillance; 
  •  Respect for the requirement of a legal basis; 
 47  For the protection of privacy in the framework of the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, see European Court of Human 
Rights, Grand Chamber, Judgment of December 4 2015,  Zakharov v Russia (47143/06). 
 48  CCPR, General Comment No 16, 8 April 1988, UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9, para 8; 
see also the Report on surveillance of communication of the Special Rapporteur on the 
promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, La Rue, 
17 April 2013, UN Doc A/HRC/23/40. 
 49  On the cumulative character of the requirement, see Joseph and Castan (n 32) paras 16, 10ff. 
 50  CCPR, GC No 16, see (n 48) para 4; therefore it is unclear which legal gap the initiative 
identiﬁ es that seeks to modify the ICCPR by way of amendment or addition. 
 51  CCPR, Concluding Observations on the US, see (n 22) para 22: ‘The State party should: 
(a) take all necessary measures to ensure that its surveillance activities, both within and outside 
the United States, conform to its obligations under the Covenant, including article 17; in 
particular, measures should be taken to ensure that any interference with the right to privacy 
complies with the principles of legality, proportionality and necessity regardless of the nationality 
or location of individuals whose communications are under direct surveillance; (b) ensure that 
any interference with the right to privacy, family, home or correspondence be authorized by 
laws that (i) are publicly accessible; (ii) contain provisions that ensure that collection of, access 
to and use of communications data are tailored to speciﬁ c legitimate aims; (iii) are sufﬁ ciently 
precise specifying in detail the precise circumstances in which any such interference may be 
permitted; the procedures for authorizing; the categories of persons who may be placed under 
surveillance; limits on the duration of surveillance; procedures for the use and storage of the 
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  •  Introducing precise criteria limiting the measures in substance as well as 
in duration; 
  •  Establishing a statutory authorization procedure as well as procedures 
for the use and storage of the data collected; 
  •  Strengthening judicial involvement and introducing effective monitoring 
mechanisms; 
  •  Refraining from imposing mandatory retention of data by third parties; 
  •  Ensuring access to effective remedies. 
  
Current US practice does not comply with these recommendations. The 
temporal and substantive limits to surveillance contained in FISA are too 
vague. Also, differential treatment on the basis of nationality or place of 
residence is not compatible with the Covenant. Finally, effective remedies 
against abuse are absent.  52  
 III.  Structural elements of the Internet constitution 
 In the end, in its Concluding Observations on the US, the Committee was 
brief in its comments on the US’ surveillance practice.  53  While this is 
certainly more than nothing, the Committee’s approach fell short of 
capturing the fundamental character of the problem as it continued to 
treat crucial questions of global communication rights exclusively within 
the traditional framework that is primarily interested in subjective rights 
against state interference. This approach misconceives that the struggle over 
the transnational constitution of the Internet cannot merely be posited as 
a struggle of individuals against nation states as the need for regulation 
doesn’t only arise from individual legal subjects defending their spheres 
of liberty against the encroachments of domestic, supranational or even 
global political systems, as classic constitutionalism envisages it. Rather, 
it is transnational legal challenges that are at issue – challenges that arise 
from societal structural conﬂ icts which, by their very nature, are beyond the 
data collected; and (iv) provide for effective safeguards against abuse; (c) reform the current 
system of oversight over surveillance activities to ensure its effectiveness, including by providing 
for judicial involvement in authorization or monitoring of surveillance measures, and considering 
to establish strong and independent oversight mandates with a view to prevent abuses; (d) refrain 
from imposing mandatory retention of data by third parties; (e) ensure that affected persons 
have access to effective remedies in cases of abuse.’ 
 52  In addition, using embassies as surveillance posts is incompatible with the principle of 
sovereign equality of states under art 2(4) of the UN Charter and with the Vienna Convention 
on Diplomatic Relations and its Additional Protocol, art 3(1)(d) VCDR with art 1(1) AP 
(500 UNTS 95). 
 53  These, by the way, are also not being respected by the German practice; on the legal 
issues, see Hoffmann-Riem (n 11). 
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individual.  54  The problem of protecting fundamental rights and democracy 
in the transnational constellation requires answers that transcend statist and 
legal-subjectivist reductionism. 
 Fundamental rights 
 The protection of the integrity of communication systems is a fundamental 
rights question that concerns the autonomy of communications processes. 
Unlike human rights protecting the physical and psychological integrity of 
individual corporeality, the protection of communicative spheres is directed 
at problems of societal communication that are structured quite differently, 
by (a) guaranteeing institutional autonomies and (b) developing personal 
spheres for enabling within the framework of these autonomies.  55  
 Protection of systems: Institutional autonomies.  First, this requires the 
radical de-individualisation of communication rights, especially with respect 
to guaranteeing the conﬁ dentiality and integrity of IT systems, which are 
particularly affected by the surveillance measures. It is therefore necessary 
to disconnect the protection objective of the liberties concerned from their 
relation to the individual.  56  Individual rights are no longer the starting 
point of the evolution of protection objectives; rather, they function as a 
procedural means of enforcement – legal subjects become advocates of un-
individual rights, which provide subjective entitlements not in substantive 
terms but in a procedural sense. The individual right becomes the annex 
to an un-individual fundamental right.  57  As Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem 
 54  For the concept of transnational law see already PC Jessup,  Transnational Law (Yale 
University Press, New Haven, CT, 1956) 2; for actual case studies and empirical evidence 
see e.g. the contributions in G Shaffer (ed),  Transnational Legal Ordering and State Change 
(Cambridge University Press, New York, NY, 2013) and TC Halliday and G Shaffer (eds), 
 Transnational Legal Orders (Cambridge University Press, New York, NY, 2015). 
 55  On the differences between fundamental and human rights, see G Teubner, ‘The 
Anonymous Matrix: Human Rights Violations by “Private” Transnational Actors’ (2006) 
69  Modern Law Review , 327. 
 56  It cannot be emphasised enough that, of course, liberty also has to be secured in the 
relationship between the individual and Internet communication, especially with respect to a socio-
digital subsistence minimum and individual guarantees, as e.g. proposed by H Maas, ‘Unsere 
digitalen Grundrechte’,  Die ZEIT , 10 December 2015; but these individual rights have to be 
complemented by a structural attempt to secure social autonomies. 
 57  O Lepsius, ‘Das Computer-Grundrecht: Herleitung – Funktion – Überzeugungskraft’ 
in F Roggan (ed),  Online-Durchsuchungen. Rechtliche und tatsächliche Konsequenzen des 
BVerfG-Urteils vom 27. Februar 2008 (Berliner Wissenschaftsverlag, Berlin, 2008) 21–56 – 
dealing with the fundamental right, developed by the German Federal Constitutional 
Court, to a guarantee of the conﬁ dentiality and integrity of IT systems (BVerfGE 120, 
274). 
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puts it: ‘In the area of global communication structures, the protection 
of communication ﬁ rstly depends on the protection of the system.’  58  
 The Committee does not yet sufﬁ ciently take into account that the 
protection against surveillance measures is not primarily about keeping the 
individual private sphere free from state intervention. Rather, autonomous 
societal communication processes also have to be protected from the 
usurpation by other societal communications processes. This requires a 
more complex concept of fundamental rights, which no longer forces 
scopes of protection and situations of interference into the schema of 
private/societal vs public/statist. This framing does not live up to the 
transformations of the relation between private and public. The critical 
issue of transnational constitutionalism is not just binding domestic security 
organisations  59  or global security apparatuses  60  to fundamental rights. 
With respect to the Internet constitution, both of these variations of an 
‘international law of the Internet’ reduce the constitutional question to 
the containment of political violence.  61  The new constitutional question 
is much more comprehensive. Whereas the old constitutional question 
concerned the justiﬁ cation and limitation of political violence,
 [w]ith the new constitutional question, the concern is to release quite 
different social energies – particularly visible in the economy, but also in 
science and technology, medicine and the new media – and to effectively 
limit their destructive effects.  62  
 With respect to the surveillance of the Internet, the challenge is thus to 
both protect the communications systems from the encroachment of 
other societal functional spheres and, at the same time, to protect these 
functional spheres from being threatened in their integrity by a net 
communication that is oriented toward maximising its own rationality. 
Put differently, the Internet must be protected from the global functional 
systems such as politics, science, the economy, etc. But vice versa, the 
Internet constitution also has to protect these spheres from encroachments 
by Internet communication. The ‘private sphere’ of Internet communication 
 58  W Hoffmann-Riem, ‘Globaler Auftrag: Der Schutz der Freiheit vor staatlichen Eingriffen 
wie vor privaten Oligopolen muss in der digitalen Welt neu gefasst werden’,  Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung , 25 June 2014 (my translation). 
 59  This is the approach of  J  Habermas ,  The Divided West ( Polity Press ,  Cambridge ,  2006 ) 
115ff. 
 60  This is the conception of  B  Fassbender ,  The United Nations Charter as the Constitution 
of the International Community ( Brill Nijhoff ,  Leiden ,  2009 ). 
 61  See also  P  Kjaer ,  Constitutionalism in the Global Realm: A Sociological Approach 
( Routledge ,  London and New York, NY ,  2014 ) 136ff. 
 62  G Teubner,  Constitutional Fragments: Societal Constitutionalism and Globalization 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) 1. 
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thus acquires a public function and an obligation to the public. The public 
character of the sphere of Internet communication is its intrinsic normativity 
in relation to society, to human individuals, and to ecology. Private/public 
is therefore not a schema of differentiation between private subjects of law 
and public statehood, but in a polycontextural society refers to the fact 
that the (private) integrity of autonomous societal spheres has to be coupled 
with the (public) world society context in such a manner that one sphere 
enables the freedom of the other sphere.  63  Freedom is the freedom of the 
others, a constitution is a mechanism of dependency.  64  It constitutively 
binds together societal spheres of autonomy. 
 Horizontal effect of fundamental rights.  In light of this, not only state and 
para-state sovereign acts require justiﬁ cation. Rather, the challenge is also 
to curtail polycentric societal spheres in their destructive tendencies so as 
to enable the curtailing of violence beyond the traditional regulatory 
formats of classic international law. The need for this reveals the gap in the 
Human Rights Committee’s Concluding Observations, as the question of 
how the expansive tendencies of globally operating communication media 
can be effectively countered remains unanswered. 
 To conceive the constitutional curtailment at the transnational level 
according to the public character of the actor,  65  falls just as short as 
identifying International Public Authority with coercive forms of action.  66  
The intensity and scope of the binding character of fundamental rights 
result neither from intrinsic characteristics of the actors nor from reasons 
innate to their action, but from societal structures, which the law reconstructs 
as public legal relationships – as the case may be, with corresponding duties 
and obligations. The point is to take seriously the fundamental rights 
dimension of the structural collisions of society and to concretise the legal 
requirements, starting from these collisions. This requires overcoming the 
question of who are the exclusive beneﬁ ciaries and obligated parties of 
fundamental rights. It calls for the development of structures that are able 
to adequately address the complexity described, structures that can counter 
the expansive tendencies of societal communication media appropriately, 
 63  G Teubner, ‘Societal Constitutionalism and the Politics of the Common’ (2010) 21 
 Finnish Yearbook of International Law 111, 113–14. 
 64  D Loick, ‘Abhängigkeitserklärung. Recht und Subjektivität’ in R Jaeggi and D Loick 
(eds),  Nach Marx: Philosophie, Kritik, Praxis (Suhrkamp, Frankfurt, 2013) 296. 
 65  A Peters, ‘The Merits of Global Constitutionalism’ (2009) 16  Indiana Journal of Global 
Legal Studies 397. 
 66  A von Bogdandy, R Wolfrum, J von Bernstorff, P Dann and M Goldmann (eds),  The 
Exercise of Public Authority by International Institutions. Advancing International Institutional 
Law (Springer, Heidelberg, 2010). 
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by way of organisation and reinforcement of self-limitating procedures.  67  
This is true for the harmful effects on society of an unfettered global 
economy just as much as it concerns the dangerous maximisations of the 
rationality of the health system, of the law, of religion, of science and the 
media. 
 No sector is exempt from the responsibility of being responsive to the 
needs of global society. However, it would be a mistake to draw a simple 
analogy and apply the fundamental rights obligations designed for the Big 
Brothers, from the NSA to the Federal Intelligence Service, par for par to 
the Big Sisters, from Google to Facebook, without doctrinal adaptations. 
This would be too direct a transfer of fundamental rights, originally state-
orientated, into other societal spheres. Instead, procedural solutions have 
to be developed that oblige both state and non-state actors to organise the 
protection of fundamental rights, each in their own way. 
 Some ﬁ rst steps toward such a new framework are gaining momentum in 
international legal practice, not least by the UN Human Rights Committee. 
In its General Comment No 16, it stated that the rights protected by Article 17 
ICCPR have to be guaranteed against attacks and interferences irrespective 
of ‘whether they emanate from State authorities or from natural or legal 
persons’.  68  Also, the former Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and 
Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Frank 
La Rue, has emphasised the obligations of the various sectors in society to 
respect data protection provisions,  69  basing himself on the respect, protect 
and remedy triad of obligations developed in the Ruggie Report.  70  This 
line of argument is explicitly carried forth by the actual Special Rapporteur 
on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and 
Expression, David Kaye.  71  
 67  I Hensel and G Teubner, ‘Horizontal Fundamental Rights as Collision Rules: How 
Transnational Pharma Groups Manipulate Scientiﬁ c Publications’ in K Blome, A Fischer-Lescano, 
H Franzki, N Markard and S Oeter (eds),  Contested Regime Collisions: Norm Fragmentation in 
World Society (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2016, forthcoming); this means also that 
new forms of accountability have to be developed; cf. the discussions about the accountability 
regime in the context of ICANN: IANA Stewardship Transition Coordination Group (ICG), 
 Proposal to Transition the Stewardship of the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) 
Functions from the U.S. Commerce Department’s National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration (NTIA) to the Global Multistakeholder Community , October 2015. 
 68  CCPR, GC No 16 (see n 48) para 1; on the horizontal effect, see also Nowak (n 43) art 2, 
at para 20; and Joseph and Castan (n 32) paras 1106ff. 
 69  Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion 
and Expression (n 48) paras 72–77. 
 70  J Ruggie, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United 
Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework, 21 March 2011, UN Doc A /HRC/17/31. 
 71  D Kaye, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right 
to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, 22 May 2015, A/HRC/29/32, para 62ff. 
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 In respect to global surveillance measures, unfortunately, the UN 
Human Rights Committee is less interested in this non-state dimension 
of surveillance – not a word has been written on the liability exemptions 
contained in FISA for the involvement of private actors in surveillance 
measures, which constitute a violation of the obligation to protect 
fundamental rights;  72  nor a word on the extraterritorial obligations to 
surrender information, which are being enforced also against US companies 
in Europe, despite well-meaning Safe Harbor agreements;  73  and ﬁ nally, 
no mention has been made of the corporate due diligence obligations 
developed in the Ruggie Report, following a network of transnational 
codes, from the UN Global Compact’s ten universal principles and the G3 
Guidelines of the Global Reporting Initiative, to the ISO 260000 on Social 
Responsibility of the International Organization for Standardization, 
the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and the 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Corporations. 
 All of these initiatives promote respect for human rights among private 
actors,  74  and – as the Guiding Principles state – they clarify the ‘role of 
business enterprises as specialized organs of society performing specialized 
functions, required to comply with all applicable laws and to respect 
human rights’.  75  International and transnational arbitral tribunals, too, 
have long begun, in the area of  lex digitalis publica , to bind private actors to 
speciﬁ c fundamental human rights.  76  And even the CJEU, in its pragmatic 
 72  See CJEU (n 9),  Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner , para 94: ‘In 
particular, legislation permitting the public authorities to have access on a generalised basis to 
the content of electronic communications must be regarded as compromising the essence of the 
fundamental right to respect for private life, as guaranteed by Article 7 of the Charter’. 
 73  US District Court for the Southern District of New York, 25 April 2014 – Memorandum 
and Order In The Matter Of A Warrant To Search A Certain E-Mail Account Controlled And 
Maintained By Microsoft Corporation (USDC, 13 Mag 2814). 
 74  Details in SD Murphy, ‘Taking Multinational Corporate Codes of Conduct to the Next 
Level’ (2005) 43  Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 389; see the CCPR’s Resolution of 
26 June 2014, UN Doc A/HRC/26/L.22, on the ‘Elaboration of an international legally binding 
instrument on transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human 
rights’. 
 75  Ruggie, Guiding Principles (n 70), preamble; see also European Parliament, Committee 
on Foreign Affairs, M Schaake, Report on ‘Human Rights and Technology: The Impact of 
Intrusion and Surveillance Systems on Human Rights and Third Countries’, 3 June 2015, A8-
0178/2015, para 32: ‘Reminds corporate actors of their responsibility to respect human rights 
throughout their global operations, regardless of where their users are located and independently 
of whether the host state meets its own human rights obligations; calls on ICT companies, 
notably those based in the EU, to implement the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights, including through the establishment of due diligence policies and risk management 
safeguards, and the provision of effective remedies when their activities have caused or 
contributed to an adverse human rights impact’. 
 76  See L Viellechner,  Transnationalisierung des Rechts (Velbrück, Weilerswist, 2013) 259ff. 
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manner of binding non-state actors to fundamental rights via the general 
principles of EU law, has asserted that Google is bound by the European 
Charter of Fundamental Rights:
 Inasmuch as the activity of a search engine is therefore liable to affect 
signiﬁ cantly … the fundamental rights to privacy and to the protection 
of personal data, the operator of the search engine as the person 
determining the purposes and means of that activity must ensure, within 
the framework of its responsibilities, powers and capabilities, that the 
activity meets the requirements … in order that the guarantees … may have 
full effect and that effective and complete protection of data subjects, 
in particular of their right to privacy, may actually be achieved.  77  
 The cooperation between governments and private actors worldwide in 
the digital domain evokes the need to reconsider the very concept of human 
rights as individual rights. Self-evidently, ‘[i]nternet governance should 
be framed around fundamental human rights principles, in particular 
transparency, openness, inclusivity, non-discrimination and equality, and 
should incorporate the right to an effective remedy’.  78  But the fact that 
Internet communication and big data enhance ‘the capacity of governments, 
companies and individuals to undertake surveillance, interception and 
data collection, which may violate or abuse human rights, in particular the 
right to privacy, as set out in article 12 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, and is therefore an issue of increasing concern’,  79  is not 
only problematic as it affects individual rights,  80  but above all as the 
transnational constellation poses new challenges to our understanding of 
fundamental rights. 
 As the UN Human Rights Committee is only interested in these crucial 
questions of global fundamental rights protection within the traditional 
framework, which seeks to defend subjective liberties against state 
encroachment, it cannot give direction for the regulation of complex societal 
 77  CJEU,  Google Spain (n 21) para 38; see also ibid, para 81: ‘In the light of the potential 
seriousness of that interference, it is clear that it cannot be justiﬁ ed by merely the economic 
interest which the operator of such an engine has in that processing.’ 
 78  C Kent, L McGregor, D Murray and A Shaheed, ‘Embedding Human Rights in Internet 
Governance’ (n 46). 
 79  UN Human Rights Council, The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, A1 April 2015, 
A/HRC/RES/28/16, at 2. 
 80  See the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Privacy as expressed in 
Human Rights Council, ibid, at 3ff, and the mandate explication by J Cannataci who was 
appointed special rapporteur in July 2015, see OHCR, Special Rapporteur on the right to 
privacy, available at < http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Privacy/SR/Pages/SRPrivacyIndex.aspx >, 
accessed 2 February 2016. 
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structural conﬂ icts such as those manifested in the global surveillance 
measures. This inappropriate framing falls short of adequately translating 
the societal structural conﬂ ict into law. It also obstructs the view to possible 
solutions for this conﬂ ict. 
 Democracy and public control 
 As a consequence, the Committee also ignores the transnational dimensions 
of the democratic question raised by the case of the global surveillance 
measures. 
 It is often enunciated that ‘cooperation between governments and private 
actors worldwide in the digital domain, including the Internet Governance 
Forum, calls for clear checks and balances and must not lead to the 
undermining of democratic and judicial oversight’.  81  But what remains 
unresolved is the question of the adequate structures for this oversight to 
be performed efﬁ ciently. 
 If Internet governance is – as in the Tunis Declaration  82  – deﬁ ned as ‘the 
development and application by governments, the private sector and civil 
society, in their respective roles, of shared principles, norms, rules, decision-
making procedures, and programmes that shape the evolution and use of 
the Internet’,  83  then it is obvious that the democratic question goes beyond 
the question of states’ democracy. In the transnational constellation it 
affects all spheres of Internet governance: civil society, multistakeholder 
processes like NETmundial, International Organisations and hybrid forms 
of collaboration. 
 The crucial point here is that for those ﬂ exible networks and organisations, 
adequate procedures and forms for self-limitation must be developed, by 
which societal communication spheres are organised democratically. In its 
Concluding Observations, the UN Human Rights Committee focuses on 
the requirement of a domestic legal basis. This is an important building 
block in a system of self-regulation of functional spheres, but it stops short 
of the self-limitation of politics. In the transnational constellation, however, 
democratic requirements must also be enforced in relation to other actors 
 81  European Parliament, Committee on Foreign Affairs, M Schaake, Report on ‘Human 
Rights and Technology: The Impact of Intrusion and Surveillance Systems on Human Rights 
and Third Countries’ (n 75) para 58. 
 82  The Tunis Summit in 2005 was one of the outcomes of Resolution 56/183 (2001) of the 
UN General Assembly, which welcomed the creation of an intergovernmental World Summit 
on the Information Society (‘WSIS’). 
 83  Tunis Agenda for the Information Society, 18 November 2005, WSIS-05/TUNIS/
DOC/6(Rev. 1)-E, para 34; see also United Nations General Assembly’s Overall Review of the 
Implementaion of WSIS Outcomes, Zero Draft, October 2015, para 32. 
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aside from states. In the area of global communication structures, the 
monopoly of information
 becomes a problem for the constitution of the new media which cannot 
be reduced to economic issues. Its worldwide digital networking activities, 
which have enabled massive intrusions into the rights to privacy, 
informational self-determination and freedom of communication, represent 
typical problems for the constitution of the global Internet. And the lack 
of transparency in Google’s governance structures points to constitutional 
questions of democracy and of public controls.  84  
 These constitutional questions cannot simply be answered by tightening the 
net of partial democratic legitimation through the nation states.  85  Rather, 
the principles of democracy and of public control need to be anchored 
and, if necessary, legally enforced within the polycentric patterns of order 
themselves.  86  For example, this applies to the data protection standards of 
Google,  87  but also to the practice of Wikileaks,  88  which has recognised 
rights set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in their ‘harm 
minimization procedure’. Such procedures provide for the deletion of 
information in the case that ‘life and limb of innocent people’ require 
protection.  89  
 It is in this ultra-cyclical link between private standards and international 
legal codiﬁ cations that we ﬁ nd untapped potential for the development 
of societal constitutionalisation processes. This, however, requires the 
institutionalisation of reﬂ exive processes and procedures that allow via 
secondary norms for the enactment, modiﬁ cation, interpretation and 
 84  G Teubner, ‘The Project of Constitutional Sociology: Irritating Nation State Constitutionalism’ 
(2013) 4  Transnational Legal Theory 44, 44–5. 
 85  Cf European Parliament, Committee on Foreign Affairs, M Schaake, Report on ‘Human 
Rights and Technology: The Impact of Intrusion and Surveillance Systems on Human Rights 
and Third Countries’ (n 75) para 58; but see J Bast, ‘Das Demokratiedeﬁ zit fragmentierter 
Internationalisierung’ in H Brunkhorst (ed),  Demokratie in der Weltgesellschaft , special issue 
no 18 of  Soziale Welt (Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2009) 185–93. 
 86  C Thornhill, ‘A Sociology of Constituent Power: The Political Code of Transnational 
Societal Constitutions’ (2013) 20  Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 551. 
 87  See Google, Privacy Policy, last updated 30 June 2015, available at < http://www.google.
com/policies/privacy/ >, accessed 2 February 2016. 
 88  Wikileaks, Standard Operating Procedures, para 1, available at < https://wikileaks.org/
About.html >, accessed 2 February 2016: ‘We derive these principles from the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. In particular, Article 19 inspires the work of our journalists and 
other volunteers. It states that everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this 
right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart 
information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers. We agree, and we seek to 
uphold this and the other Articles of the Declaration.’ 
 89  Ibid, para 1.2. 
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implementation of the primary norms. Monitoring and implementation 
bodies need to be established, tasked with mediating between the abstract 
corporate principles and the concrete corporate decisions.  90  
 Such procedures do not spring forth spontaneously and fully formed. 
Indeed, it requires external and internal pressure and, if need be, judicial 
advocacy and control to be exerted if Codes of Conduct are to be more 
than PR strategies, for a Safe Harbor initiative such as the EU’s  91  not to 
end up as a mere merchandising instrument.  92  A strengthening of self-
limiting procedures can be achieved by introducing institutionalised forms 
of self-regulation, through political control. Such externally regulated self-
regulation is distinct from deregulation in that it doesn’t renounce control 
in a  laissez-faire manner, but introduces binding, even judicial control 
mechanisms that combine internal and external monitoring bodies.  93  
 The ﬁ rst steps in this direction have been made, for instance, by strengthening 
transparency through reporting duties for businesses with respect to human 
rights scenarios, or by requiring the establishment of Corporate Social 
Responsibility institutions.  94  Only when these mechanisms and institutions 
are obliged to cooperate with politically established institutions – penal 
and administrative agencies, domestic courts, national and international 
human rights bodies – can a network of legal control develop in which legal 
norms become effective. This requires the adjustment of an asymmetrical 
judicialisation, as a result of which private actors and transnational 
corporations can enforce their claims in various international forums, 
most notably courts of arbitration, while it is virtually inconceivable that 
they will ever ﬁ nd themselves in the position of defendant in the forums of 
global justice.  95  Their partial recognition as subjects of international 
law results in an entitlement under international law without sufﬁ ciently 
effective corresponding obligations. Only if these gaps are closed by a 
 90  G Teubner, ‘Self-constitutionalizing TNCs? On the Linkage of “Private” and “Public” 
Corporate Codes of Conduct’ (2011) 18(2) Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 617. 
 91  On the inefffectiveness of this mechanism and the concluding violation of fundamental 
rights see CJEU (n 9),  Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner , para 94ff; for 
a critical assessment, see also P Schaar, ‘Lässt sich die globale Internetüberwachung noch 
bändigen?’ (2013) 46  Zeitschrift für Rechtspolitik 214–16. 
 92  See the criticism in J Seeger, ‘To cloud or not to cloud. Editorial’  iX. Magazin für 
professionelle Informationstechnik 11/2011: ‘that these provisions aren’t worth the paper they 
are printed on’ (my translation). 
 93  To this effect G Teubner, ‘Substantive and Reﬂ exive Elements in Modern Law’ (1983) 
17  Law and Society Review 239. 
 94  S  Deva ,  Regulating Corporate Human Rights Violations: Humanising Business ( Routledge , 
 London and New York, NY ,  2012 )  96 . 
 95  J von Bernstorff, ‘Die UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights’, November 
2012, available at < https://www.unesco.de/wissenschaft/2012/uho-1112-keynote-bernstorff.
html >, accessed 2 February 2016. 
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combination of internal and external control mechanisms can a juridiﬁ cation 
develop that is powerful enough to enforce the promises of the Codes of 
Conduct and of the Corporate Social Responsibility initiatives. 
 Beyond establishing opportunities for control and participation that link 
the levels of the organisation with societal constitutions, the preconditions 
for forming a democratic public must be secured. 
 Empowering a critical public.  This requires ﬁ rst and foremost that a 
critical public can ﬁ nd spaces to bring such concerns to attention.  96  
However, the UN Human Rights Committee has shown little interest in 
the question of transnational control mechanisms, as the suppression of 
whistleblowing and restrictions on democratic procedures are not discussed 
in its Concluding Observations. Even though the shadow reports to the 
US state report called for substantive protection for whistleblowers with 
reference to Article 19 ICCPR,  97  the Committee chooses to ignore the 
matter entirely. 
 Whistleblowing is a crucial mechanism that promotes democratic control.  98  
By ignoring this dimension, the UN Human Rights Committee misses 
an important opportunity to develop a legal framework through which 
democratic forces may impel greater regulation of the actions of the state. 
If, as Foucault developed in his critique of Bentham,  99  the total control of 
the network of the security apparatuses isn’t to be replaced by a panoptic 
scheme from below, there must of course also be limits to whistleblowing. 
 96  GW Anderson, ‘Societal Constitutionalism, Social Movements, and Constitutionalism 
from Below’ (2013) 20  Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 881. 
 97  E.g., see the Shadow Report by the NGO ‘Article 19’ for the October 2013 session of 
the UN Human Rights Committee: ‘Protecting whistleblowers that hold governments and 
institutions to account is central to protecting the right to freedom of expression under 
international law, available at < https://www.article19.org/resources.php/resource/37185/en >, 
accessed 2 February 2016. 
 98  G Teubner, ‘Whistle-blowing in the Stampede? Comment on B Frey and R Cuenis, 
‘Moral Hazard and Herd Behaviour in Financial Markets’ in S Grundmann, F Möslein and 
K Riesenhuber (eds),  Contract Governance (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015) 100–5; 
see also Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Committee on Legal Affairs, Report: 
‘Mass Surveillance’, Rapporteur Pieter Omtzigt (n 39) para 122: ‘But even after appropriate 
legal limits and oversight mechanisms have been established on the national level and on the 
international plane in the form of a multilateral “intelligence codex”, whistle-blowing will be 
needed as the most effective tool for enforcing the limits placed on surveillance. The activities 
of secret services are by nature difﬁ cult to scrutinise by any of the usual judicial or parliamentary 
control mechanisms. Access of any monitoring bodies to relevant information and capacity 
issues in view of the huge volume of activity to be monitored will always remain a problem for 
effective supervision. The “sword of Damocles’’ of the disclosure of any abuses by well-
protected inside whistle-blowers may well constitute the most powerful deterrent against 
serious violations of the legal limits that should in our view be placed under surveillance.’ 
 99  Foucault (n 7) 195ff. 
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However, these limits cannot be determined by the needs of politics or 
the military; rather, they must themselves be at the disposition of the 
democratic process.  100  
 A Right to encryption.  But the democratic question does not only call for 
a societal wide discussion of surveillance. A process of double reﬂ exivity 
must be organised, in order to enable emancipation from the panoptic 
schema. The function of the constitution results from the very fact that it 
links reﬂ exive processes of the law to reﬂ exive processes of society. Politics 
is limited and constituted by a political constitution, the economy by the 
economic constitution, and so on. It is the very point of the constitutional 
idea that any constitution, while legally regulating the formation of law, 
also releases self-limiting forces. 
 Edward Snowden alludes to how this can be achieved for the Internet 
constitution when he replaces the idea of limiting power by the constitution 
with the idea of limiting power by cryptography, following Thomas 
Jefferson’s response to the question of political power:
 While I pray that public awareness and debate will lead to reform, bear 
in mind that the policies of men change in time, and even the Constitution 
is subverted when the appetites of power demand it. In words from 
history: Let us speak no more of faith in man, but bind him down from 
mischief by the chains of cryptography.  101  
 Contrary to Snowden’s view, though, a constitution and cryptography 
are not mutually exclusive. To the contrary, cryptography must form a 
central element of the Internet constitution. In the reﬂ exive application of 
the digital code to itself and in its linkage to a constitutionally protected 
right to use encryption, a capillary constitution of Internet communication 
develops. Cryptography becomes an element of a ‘constitutionalization from 
below’, in which the users overcome the panoptic schema. The fundamental 
right to cryptography and the free choice of encryption methods emanate 
from the right to privacy. This right must therefore also grant protection 
against prosecution based on the use of cryptography. The right to resist 
surveillance necessitates a counterbalance of a constitutional right to digital 
self-defence. This results in a duty – applicable to states and corporations – 
to promote opportunities for using cryptography. 
 100  A Fischer-Lescano, ‘Putting Proportionality into Proportion: Whistleblowing in 
Transnational Law’ in K Blome  et al . (n 67). 
 101  E Snowden, cited after C Friedersdorf, ‘Edward Snowden’s Other Motive for Leaking’, 
 The Atlantic, 13 May 2014. The well-known original quote goes: ‘In questions of power, then, 
let no more be heard of conﬁ dence in man, but bind him down from mischief by the chains of 
the Constitution.’ 
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 Consequently, in their ‘Resolution in Support of the Freedom to Use 
Cryptography’, the members of the Global Internet Liberty Campaign 
(GILC) emphasise that the right to an unhindered use of cryptographic 
technologies ﬂ ows from the right to privacy.  102  That legal access to 
encryption technologies and effective protection of the use of such 
technologies are crucial issues in the enforcement of the right to privacy, 
is also highlighted in the OECD Cryptography Policy Guidelines,  103  as well 
as in the Common Statement on Cryptography by the International Working 
Group on Data Protection in Telecommunication (IWGDPT).  104  While 
the UN Human Rights Committee has yet to take a position on this, the 
challenge will be to extend the scope of protection of Article 17 ICCPR to 
such forms of constitutionalisation of the Internet.  105  
 Cryptography modiﬁ es the panoptic schema and allows for the 
anonymisation of data and communication. It is part of a strategy to 
establish breaks, vision barriers and protection measures through the  chains 
of social constitutions that foster the self-limiting procedures of social 
systems. In the end, the liberty safeguards that Foucault envisages in his 
critique of the panoptic schema  106  can only be established by way of a 
 102  Global Internet Liberty Campaign (GILC), Resolution in Support of the Freedom to 
Use Cryptography, September 25, 1996 (Appendix B); on the right to cryptography as a ‘right 
to be unheard’ under US law, see PE Reiman, ‘Cryptography and the First Amendment: The 
Right to be Unheard’ (1996) 14  John Marshall Journal of Computer & Information Law 325; 
for a German perspective, see J Gerhards , (Grund-)Recht auf Verschlüsselung? (Nomos, 
Baden-Baden, 2010). 
 103  OECD Cryptography Policy Guidelines. Recommendation of the Council Concerning 
Guidelines for Cryptography Policy, 27 March 1997. 
 104  International Working Group on Data Protection in Telecommunication (IWGDPT), 
Common Statement on Cryptography, 12 September 1997. 
 105  See also D Kaye, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of 
the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression (n 71), who insists on the implication of art 
17 ICCPR (para 16ff) and concludes (para 62ff): ‘At a minimum, companies should adhere to 
principles such as those laid out in the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, the 
Global Network Initiative’s Principles on Freedom of Expression and Privacy, the European 
Commission’s ICT Sector Guide on Implementing the UN Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights, and the Telecommunications Industry Dialogue Guiding Principles. Companies, 
like States, should refrain from blocking or limiting the transmission of encrypted communications 
and permit anonymous communication. Attention should be given to efforts to expand the 
availability of encrypted data-centre links, support secure technologies for websites and 
develop widespread default end-to-end encryption. Corporate actors that supply technology to 
undermine encryption and anonymity should be especially transparent as to their products and 
customers. The use of encryption and anonymity tools and better digital literacy should be 
encouraged. The Special Rapporteur, recognizing that the value of encryption and anonymity 
tools depends on their widespread adoption, encourages States, civil society organizations and 
corporations to engage in a campaign to bring encryption by design and default to users around 
the world’. 
 106  Foucault (n 7) 195ff. 
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combination of constitutional limitation and visibility refraction; only in 
this way can the architecture of the transnational panopticon itself be 
changed, and only in this way is the core of the issue addressed: that the 
subtle mechanisms of societal energies (here, of Internet communication) 
have to be at once released and limited in their destructive effects. 
 IV.  Conclusion 
 In its Concluding Observations to the 2014 US state report, the UN 
Human Rights Committee recalled essential preconditions for the regulation 
of global communication structures. It correctly emphasised the extraterritorial 
effect of fundamental rights and urgently called for proportionality in the 
use of extraterritorial surveillance measures, in accordance with law. 
 However, thus far the Committee has yet to thoroughly engage with 
issues resulting from transnational surveillance practice beyond subjective 
rights vis-à-vis state encroachment. However, as it has now become clear, 
the legal issues of the Internet constitution are too complex to be dealt 
with in this regulatory framework alone. The search for contemporary 
forms of protection for the integrity of communicative systems and the 
defence against threats from anonymous societal matrices requires in-depth 
engagement with world-society structural conﬂ icts. The constitutional 
challenge is therefore, to enable the release and limitation of societal 
energies in a way that is adequate to their subject matter, beyond the state 
system of society. Consequentially, a framework for the horizontal effect 
of fundamental rights must be developed that takes into account democratic 
questions of procedures and forums in which societal self-normation 
practices can be institutionalised. 
 The Internet and email communication have only existed for about 
30 years. In order to ensure that legal frameworks remain responsive to 
modern realities, the centuries-old  ius inter gentes of the Westphalian state 
system must be advanced. If international law is to make a contribution to the 
struggle over the Internet constitution, our understanding of international 
public law needs to evolve alongside transnational forms of power generated 
by societal communication media beyond how we understand international 
law today – beyond the traditional political sphere. These regulation efforts 
must overcome subjectivist and statist reductionism, in order to be able to 
take such problematic constellations into account if we are to defend and 
protect human rights against an ever-encroaching global panopticon. 
